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Comment
Divestiture as a Private Remedy
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States declared in 1961'
that divestiture should be considered a primary remedy ' for vio-
lations of section 7 of the Clayton Act.' Though this statement
arose in the context of a government-pursued lawsuit,4 a steady
stream of legal commentary since that time has asserted that
private parties should be extended the remedy of divestiture.5
The need for private divestiture and its beneficial attributes are
1. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 331
(1961).
2. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, stated:
It cannot be gainsaid that complete divestiture is peculiarly appropriate
in cases of stock acquisitions which violate § 7 .... The very words of § 7
suggest that an undoing of the acquisition is a natural remedy .... Divesti-
ture has been called the most important of the antitrust remedies. it is
simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure. It should always be in the
forefront of a court's mind when a violation of § 7 has been found.
Id at 328-31.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
4. The action was filed by the government under section 15 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976), which has been interpreted as empowering the gov-
ernment to seek divestiture. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
5. See Guerrini, Equitable Remedies in the Private Enforcement of Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act: Do Divestiture and Recission Create a Panacea or
Open a Pandora's Box?, 12 Loy U. CHI. L.J. 427, 438 (1981); Kintner & Wilberd-
ing, Enforcement of the Merger Laws by Private Party Litigation, 47 IND. L.J.
293, 294 (1972); Peacock, Private Divestiture Suits Under Section 16 of the
Clayton Act, 48 TEX. L. REV. 54, 83 (1969); Turner, Halverson & Berger, Sym-
posium: Private Enforcement of the Antimerger Laws, 31 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y.
239, 254-57 (1976); Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a
Remedy for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act-Revisited, 42 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 80, 108 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Private Divestiture Revisited]; Com-
ment, Private Divestiture: Antitrust's Latest Problem Child, 41 FORDHAM L.
REV. 569, 604 (1973); Note, The Use of Divestiture in Private Antitrust Suits,
43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 261, 286-87 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Use of Divesti-
ture]; Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a Remedy for
Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 MINN. L. REV. 267, 283 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as Private Divestiture]; 89 HARV. L. REV. 1247, 1253 (1976).
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widely affirmed,6 yet no court in the sixty-eight year history of
the Clayton Act has compelled a divestiture at the instance of a
private party.
A substantial level of continuing merger activity7 and recent
questions regarding the willingness of the Reagan Administra-
tion to enforce the antimerger laws8 serve to sharpen the in-
terest in private enforcement by divestiture. The purpose of this
comment is to probe the dilemma presented by private divesti-
ture. In so doing, an effort is made to present an unbiased anal-
ysis of reasoning which opposes as well as supports adoption of
the remedy.'
II. THE STATUTES
Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides that a private party ° is
entitled to "injunctive relief ... against threatened loss or dam-
age by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . under the same condi-
tions ... as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will
cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity .. . '."1Section
16 supplements section 4 of the Clayton Act,12 which provides the
6. See infra notes 123-39 and accompanying text.
7. See 1981 Merger Activity Sets Record in Numbers, Aggregate Dollar
Volume, 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1048, at 154 (January 21,
1982) (239 merger announcements in 1981, up 27% over the level of 1980).
8. See FTC's Budget Drops 11%, Justice's Budget is Stable, 42 AN-
TITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1051, at 308 (February 11, 1982) (Reagan
Administration proposed an 11% cut in the budget of the Federal Trade Com-
mission for fiscal 1983); Justice Will Shut Down Field Office in Los Angeles,
Reduce Size of Others, 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1041, at A-3
(November 26, 1981) (due to budget cuts, 30 to 100 field office attorneys of the
Antitrust Division are to be transferred to other positions); Baxter Denies Re-
sponsibility for Increase In Merger Activity at Subcommittee Hearing, 42 ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1029, at A-16 (August 27, 1981) (former
Federal Trade Commissioner testifies at congressional hearing that current
merger wave is fueled by the perception of business "that the merger laws are
not going to be enforced" as they were in previous administrations).
9. In all the legal commentary on this subject to date, the writers have
concluded that private parties should be permitted to seek divestiture. See
supra note 5. In so concluding the writers have presented persuasively but one
side of the multifaceted dilemma concerned. Although the effort herein is in-
tended to be unbiased, greater emphasis has been placed on the reasoning op-
posing private divestiture given its absence from the literature heretofore.
10. As used herein a private party is "any person, firm, corporation, or as-
sociation .... " Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
11. Id.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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private party with an action for treble damages to recover for in-
jury to "his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws ... ."' The antitrust laws whose viola-
tion may give rise to a private cause of action in the case of an
actual or impending illegal merger are section 7 of the Clayton
Act and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.14
Section 7 of the Clayton Act forbids the acquisition by one cor-
poration of the stock or assets of another corporation where the
effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly."'" The emphasis in section 7 on the probable
rather than the actual efforts of an acquisition makes it of pri-
mary interest to both government and private parties seeking to
attack a merger." Section 1 of the Sherman Act," by comparison,
requires for proof of a violation a showing of an actual substan-
tial lessening of competition by reason of the merger. 8 Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 9 which prohibits monopolization, attempts
to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize, requires a demon-
stration of monopoly power and its willful acquisition by the de-
fendant.' Clearly, section 7 of the Clayton Act represents the
plaintiff's most favorable vehicle for attacking a merger.
Hence, to be entitled to a section 16 remedy, a private party
must show a violation of section 7 which threatens the party
with loss or damage and circumstances such that a court of eq-
uity would grant relief.
III. THE CASE LAW
The latter half of the nineteenth century hosted great changes
to the economy of the United States.2' Post Civil War industrial-
ization was marked by a shift to the corporation as the major
13. Id
14. E. W. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 99-100 (2d ed. 1973).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). The substantive law of section 7 is beyond the
scope of this humble comment.
16. KINTNER, supra note 14, at 100.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
18. National Soc'y. of Professional Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
691 (1978).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
20. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
21. 1 H.A. TOULMIN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES 93 (1949).
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form of business enterprise. Thriving in an unregulated, capital-
istic economy and unchecked by government interference, the
corporate form gradually produced giants of economic and social
power.'
The transition from sole proprietorship and partnership forms
of business to the corporate form of business also defined a con-
centration of wealth and power in the hands of a few individuals.
The railroad pools, trusts, and holding companies which arose
during the late 1800's exemplify this point.23 Arbitrary business
practices of a few powerful individuals impacted adversely on
society in general and gradually induced a great clamor for gov-
ernment regulation. The antimonopoly sentiment culminated in
passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, significantly, with but a
single dissenting vote.24
Although enforcement of the Sherman Act in the years im-
mediately following its passage was slow in developing,25 the
availability of divestiture, or dissolution," as a government rem-
edy' for violations of the Act was never really questioned. 8 The
22. KINTNER, supra -note 14, at 4-6.
23. Id. at 7-9.
24. Id. at 11.
25. Id
26. Attempts have been made by writers and courts to distinguish substan-
tively between the remedies of divestiture and dissolution, especially for the
purpose of discrediting legislative history, see infra notes 65-68 & 111-14 and ac-
companying text, adverse to the remedy of private divestiture. See, e.g., Guer-
rini, supra note 5, at 433. It seems clear, however, that for the purposes of sec-
tion 16 of the Clayton Act no such distinction should be made. Congressional
records, see International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518
F.2d 913, 921 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing Hearings on Trust Legislation Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 63d Congress, 2d Sess. 261, 492, 649-50,
1372-73 (1914)), and early court cases, see, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911), indicate thatthe remedy then deemed appropriate
to break up illegal combinations was dissolution. Dissolution was carried out by
directing the transfer of stock held by the defendant trust back to the original
stockholders, effectively divesting the trust of the illegally acquired stock. 518
F.2d at 923-24. There is no essential difference between the remedy of dissolu-
tion, as it was envisioned by Congress at the time of passage of the Clayton Act
and applied to trusts and holding companies, and the remedy of divestiture, as
it is now applied to illegal acquisitions. Accord Wise, Three D's of Antitrust En-
forcement, 3 HOFFMAN'S ANTITRUST LAW AND TECHNIQUES 407-08 (M. Hoffman
& A. Winard ed. 1963); Private Divestiture, supra note 5, at 270 n.21 (citing Op.
PENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS 885 (1948)). Divestiture will be
used hereafter to refer to dissolution as well as divestiture.
27. Sherman Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
28. See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See generally Adams, Dissolution,
616 [Vol. 20:613
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first judicial decree of divestiture was handed down in 1899.1 A
series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States
shortly thereafter affirmed the viability of the remedy. 0 The
Clayton Act, enacted in 1914 as a reaction to lax enforcement
and judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act,"1 broadened the
scope of corporate vulnerability to attack.2 The Clayton Act de-
clared illegal stock acquisitions which had a probable effect of
lessening competition."
Private enforcement of the antitrust laws by divestiture has
never been quite so well received as government divestiture. In
1904, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend that
the antitrust laws should be enforced by private actions seeking
to prevent violations. 4 The congressional answer to the Court's
holding was embodied in section 16 of the Clayton Act, which un-
equivocally granted a private right to injunctive relief for viola-
tion of any of the antitrust laws.35 In Venner v. Pennsylvania
Steel Co.,' however, the Court excluded divestiture from the
reaches of section 16, holding that a consummated acquisition
was not "threatened conduct"3 within the meaning of section
16.38 This distinction frequently arises in the opinion of courts de-
nying the availability of private divestiture. 9
The judicial history of private divestiture abounds in confu-
sion.40 While many courts have considered the issue, compara-
Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND. L.J. 1
(1951).
29. Comment, supra note 5, at 581.
30. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
31. See KINTNER, supra note 14, at 11-13; Comment, supra note 5, at 583.
32. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text. Section 15 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976), empowers the government to seek for violations of
the Clayton Act, the same remedies sought under section 4 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976). See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
33. See supra text accompanying note 15.
34. Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 70-71 (1904).
35. 38 Stat. 737 (1914) (as amended 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976)).
36. 250 F. 292 (C.C.D.N.J. 1918).
37. Clayton Act § 16 (1976).
38. 250 F. at 296.
39. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
40. The judicial history of private divestiture is treated cursorily in this
comment, in view of the substantial histories detailed by other writers. See
Peacock, supra note 5, at 66-77; Comment, supra note 5, at 579-97.
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tively few have thoughtfully analyzed the question in any depth.41
Courts finding private divestiture available have presumed its
availability," interpreted the language of section 16 to clearly in-
clude divestiture,4" and cited cases which themselves provide no
authority for the conclusion." Often the assertion is dicta.45 Courts
concluding that the remedy is unavailable have typically been
equally unpersuasive. They have presumed its unavailability,46 in
dicta,47 without argument.48 They have assumed that no one
would argue for its availability.49 They have interpreted the lan-
guage clearly to exclude the remedy."0 Courts which have found
the remedy available have most often declared it useful in only a
limited range of cases where no other remedy is appropriate and
thereafter determined it inappropriate in the situation at hand.5
41. See infra notes 61-77 and accompanying text.
42. See Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 340 F. Supp. 76,
81-82 (N.D. Cal. 1972); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-Am. Sugar Co., 152
F. Supp. 387, 400-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
43. See Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 526
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y. of Composers, Authors
and Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888, 898-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
44. See Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780,
797 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (citing Burkhead v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 308 F. Supp. 120
(N.D. Cal. 1970)); Burkhead, 308 F. Supp. at 126-127 (concurring with Julius M.
Ames Co.); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705,
717 (D. Hawaii 1964) (citing Am. Crystal Sugar Co.), aff'd per curiam, 401 F. 2d
182 (9th Cir. 1968).
45. See Credit Bureau Reports, Inc., 358 F. Supp. at 797; Bailey's Bakery,
Ltd, 235 F. Supp. at 717; American Crystal Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. at 400-01.
46. See Continental Sec. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d 378, 379-80
(6th Cir. 1926).
47. See id.
48. See American Commercial Barge Line Co. v. Eastern Gas & Fuel
Ass'n., 204 F. Supp. 451, 453 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
49. See Graves v. Cambria Steel Co., 298 F. 761, 762 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1924).
50. See Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 250 F. 292, 296 (C.C.D.N.J. 1918).
51. Only three courts have directed, at the instance of a private party, that
a plan for divestiture be drawn. See Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 389 F.
Supp. 996 (D.N.J. 1974), rev'd and remanded sub. nom. NBO Indus. Treadway
Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F. 2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975); Calnetics Corp. v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1973); International Tel. &
Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii 1972),
rev'd on this question, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1974). In three instances a district
court actually ordered divestiture but later retracted. See Calnetics Corp. v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1972); American Crystal
Sugar Co. v. Cuban-Am. Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 259 F.2d
524 (2d Cir. 1958); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y. of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See generally Private
Divestiture-Revisited, supra note 5, at 86-88.
[Vol. 20:613
Divestiture
In 1961, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the case
of United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.," reversing
the district court's determination that divestiture was not appro-
priate under the circumstances because of the severe economic
detriment which would be forced upon duPont's stockholders.'
The court characterized divestiture as the most important anti-
trust remedy" and a remedy suggested by the language of sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act.55 The duPont case was a government-
initiated lawsuit, but legal commentary" and courts alike57 were
quick to suggest the analogy to the private situation. The duPont
Court's language lent some strength to the argument in favor of
private divestiture. Encouraged by the steady stream of com-
mentary that uniformly asserted the availability of private di-
vestiture, 8 courts which considered the issue after duPont in-
creasingly concluded that divestiture was available to private
plaintiffs. 9 It seemed as though the confusion might finally give
way to uniformity without need for guidance from the Supreme
Court. Then came ITT.
60
In the most thoroughly considered judicial opinion to that
date"1 on the availability of private divestiture, the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii, in International
Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone & Elec-
tronics Corp. (ITT),62 evaluated the precedent, the legislative
history, and the policy and concluded not only that divestiture
should be available to the private litigant, but also that it was
appropriate in the present circumstances. 3 The court decreed
that General Telephone & Electronics (GTE) should divest itself
of certain subsidiaries. On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the decision of the district court
52. 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
53. Id. at 320-21.
54. Id. at 330-31.
55. Id at 329.
56. See Private Divestiture, supra note 5, at 283.
57. See, e.g., Burkhead v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 308 F. Supp. 120, 127
n.10, (N.D. Cal. 1970).
58. See supra note 5.
59. See 89 HARV. L. REV. 1247, 1249 & n.21 (1976).
60. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d
913 (9th Cir. 1975).
61. 1972
62. 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii 1972).
63. Id at 1211.
19821
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about the availability of divestiture was reversed."
Finding precedent unpersuasive and the statute's reference to
"injunctive relief" ambiguous, the court of appeals referred to
the legislative history of section 16 to interpret its meaning. 5 In
hearings before the House Judiciary Committee, the court of ap-
peals found colloquies among committee members and witnesses
indicating that the term "injunctive relief' was not understood
by the committee to encompass divestiture. Although the court
admitted that the intent of Congress on this matter was not
clear, 7 the legislative history of section 16 embodied in the com-
mittee hearings was deemed sufficiently conclusive to support a
holding that private parties were not entitled to the remedy of
divestiture." The court further concluded that the use of restric-
tive injunctions to achieve divestiture indirectly was equally re-
pugnant to the statute.69 The popular trend toward permitting
private divestiture was thereby dealt an unexpected setback."0
A response to the ITT decision was not long in coming. Four
months after the ITT decision, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, in NBO Industries Treadway Cos. v.
Brunswick Corp. ,7 criticized the approach of the ITT court in in-
terpreting section 16. As in ITT, the lower court in NBO had
ordered divestiture. Though the court of appeals ultimately
found divestiture inappropriate in the present situation,73 the
court found it desirable to consider the reaches of section 16. An
independent review by the NBO court of the legislative history
64. 518 F.2d at 920.
65. Id. at 921.
66. Id. at 922. The district court concluded that legislative material other
than committee reports was inconclusive and, hence, disregarded the committee
hearings, 351 F. Supp. at 1207 n.150.
67. 518 F.2d at 922.
68. Id
69. 518 F.2d at 924. It is interesting to note that even though the court of
appeals concluded that private parties could not seek divestiture, the court still
felt compelled to show deference to Justice Brennan's oft-quoted remarks in du-
Pont, see supra note 2 regarding the desirability of divestiture. Id at 925.
70. One commentator concluded, prior to the court of appeals decision in
ITT, that the case law trend had realized "its inevitable conclusion" with the
granting of divestiture to private plaintiffs. Comment, supra note 5, at 597.
Another speculated that "the authority to order divestiture under section 16
will ultimately be upheld." Use of Divestiture, supra note 5, at 268.
71. 523 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975).
72. 389 F. Supp. at 1002.




of section 16 was found to be supportive of the conclusions of the
ITT court.7" The court of appeals in NBO, however, questioned
the propriety of relying on legislative history dating to 1914 to
control the contemporary interpretation of a statute setting
forth fundamental economic policy."5 Characterizing the antitrust
laws as statements of general principle, the court suggested that
the circumstances to which application of the statute is presently
sought were dimly perceived at the time of its passage and that
the antitrust laws should be given meaning on a case-by-case
basis." It should be noted, however, that the court declined to
determine a rule about the availability of divestiture under sec-
tion 16."
That same year, a United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, in Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v.
Amstar Corp., refused to dismiss a count of the plaintiff's com-
plaint seeking divestiture. 9 After a brief review of the precedent
and commentary, the court quoted extensively from the NBO
opinion and characterized the hearings utilized by the ITT court
to interpret section 16 as "inconclusive scraps of legislative his-
tory.'"" Emphasizing the traditional latitude given a court of
equity in fashioning appropriate remedies and the merits of di-
vestiture in an antitrust setting, s" the court concluded that di-
vestiture was a potential remedy for private parties injured by
violations of the Clayton Act.82 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, in a subsequent decision, 3 reserved
treatment of the issue for a future date.84
74. Id. at 278.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 279. NBO is often misquoted as standing for the proposition that
divestiture is available to private parties. See e.g., Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc.
v. Amstar Corp., 402 F. Supp. 636, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Turner, Halverson &
Berger, supra note 5, at 254.
78. 402 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
79. Id. at 640.
80. Id at 639. The Fuchs court relied on the concurring opinion of Justice
Jackson in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951), to dis-
credit the reliability of any legislative materials other than committee reports.
81. The broad language of Justice Brennan in duPont, see supra note 2,
was once again cited approvingly. 402 F. Supp. at 640.
82. 402 F. Supp. at 640.
83. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
84. Id. at 296 n.55 The district court recognized the divergence of opinion
on the subject but concluded that divestiture was not appropriate in the pre-
1982]
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The historical predilection 5 of the Southern District of New
York for interpreting section 16 to include divestiture was again
affirmed in Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. DIC Concrete Corp.,8"
where the court refused to dismiss the plaintiff's claims under
section 7 of the Clayton Act on the basis that divestiture is ndt
available to a private party. 7 As in foregoing decisions on this
issue, the court reviewed the decisions of other courts, partic-
ularly ITT, NBO, and Fuchs. Citing significant change in both
the economy and the antitrust laws since the adoption of section
16, the court balanced the legislative history cited in ITT against
"the effective realization of an important national policy" as em-
bodied in the general purposes behind the antimerger law and
concluded that divestiture should be available to private
parties."
Hence, a certain momentum appears to be building in the
courts toward permitting private divestiture despite the devast-
ating blow dealt by the Ninth Circuit in 1975. Courts considering
the issue since ITT and NBO have uniformly concluded, when a
conclusion was necessary and sometimes when it was not, that a
private party should be permitted the remedy of divestiture, or
have recognized the dilemma and postponed the issue for future
consideration.89 Law review commentary on the issue has been
scant since 1975.90 It should be noted that no court of appeals has
to date concluded that section 16 provides for divestiture. One
should not be hasty in assuming the inevitability of this
remedy.
1
sent circumstances. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404,
428 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
85. See supra notes 42, 43, 78 & 84 and accompanying text.
86. 467 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
87. Id at 1025.
88. Id
89. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Ohio-
Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cases P64,507 (1/29/82),
Nos. 81-1542, 81-1615, recognized the searching review of the legislative history
made by the court of appeals in ITT, but declined to decide the issue in view of
the inappropriateness of divestiture in the present case. Id at P72,810. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Kansas Power
& Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n., 554 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1977), recog-
nized the private divestiture issue as unsettled in that circuit, but chose not to
resolve it. Id at 1185 n.10.
90. See supra note 5.
91. See supra note 70.
622 [Vol. 20:613
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IV. Is DIVESTITURE AVAILABLE UNDER SECTION 16?
A preliminary question in the analysis of this issue is whether
section 16 includes the remedy of divestiture. This question is
distinct from another question which is often addressed simulta-
neously without distinction, that is, whether divestiture should
be available to private parties. The former question may be ap-
proached from two positions: first, whether the language of sec-
tion 16 is amenable to the conclusion that divestiture is encom-
passed therein; and second, whether the legislative history of
section 16 affords guidance in the interpretation of the statute.
A. The Language of the Statute
It is apparent that the language of section 16 has caused some
confusion in the courts-whether justified or not.2 The first
point for discussion is whether divestiture is a form of "injunc-
tive relief ... granted by courts of equity" within the meaning of
section 16. It has been persuasively argued that "injunctive
relief" is broad enough to encompass mandatory as well as
prohibitive injunctions and that divestiture is merely a form of
mandatory injunction. 3 The interpretation of "injunctive relief"
as including divestiture is further strengthened by the historical
development of the remedy, for divestiture has often been
accomplished by a plurality of prohibitive injunctions. 4 The
counter-interpretation arises from the failure of Congress to
specify expressly in section 16 the remedy of divestiture.
Divestiture and injunctive relief, in the ordinary usage of these
terms, express distinct forms of relief.9" Where divestiture is in-
tended, it is most frequently stated in a form distinct from in-
junctive relief."
92. One may argue that the myriad of opinions regarding the language of
section 16 results not from confusion about the language but rather an effort by
some courts to rationalize their outcome determinative decision that divestiture
should not be available to private parties. See Peacock, supra note 5, at 68.
93. See Private Divestiture-Revisited, supra note 5, at 86; Private Di-
vestiture, supra note 5, at 278-79. See also Comment, supra note 5, at 588-90
(background on mandatory injunctiohs).
94. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. at 78.
95. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 536 (1947) ("And so we assume that Congress uses common
words in their popular meaning, as used in the common speech of men.")
96. See, e.g., Kintner & Wilberding, supra note 5, at 299 ("The counterpart
19821 623
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However, section 15 of the Clayton Act," the governmental
counterpart to section 16, includes no reference to divestiture
and yet has been interpreted to include the remedy.98 Both
courts99 and commentators' have cited this anomaly and argued
by analogy that the similar language of section 16 should be read
impliedly to encompass divestiture. While the point made by this
popular argument is well taken, other points are deserving of
some consideration. First, the language of section 15 is identical,
in all relevant aspects, with the language of section 4 of the
Sherman Act.1 ' Because the Sherman Act was passed with an
eye toward breaking up the large trusts, 2 there was never any
doubt that section 4 empowered the government to seek divesti-
ture, despite the lack of specific reference to the remedy." 3 Sec-
to the equitable remedies of injunction and divestiture ...."). But see United
States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 378 F. Supp. 24, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (speaking of
divestiture, the court noted that "the only relief the government is seeking is
an injunction.").
97. Section 15 states:
That the several district courts of the United States are invested with ju-
risdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this Act, and it shall be the
duty of the several United States attorneys, in their respective districts,
under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in
equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be
by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation
shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of
shall have been duly notified of such petition, the court shall proceed, as
soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending
such petition, and before final decree, the court may at any time make
such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in
the premises. Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any
such proceeding may be pending that the ends of justice require that
other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause
them to be summoned whether they reside in the district in which the
court is held or not, and subpoenas to that end may be served in any dis-
trict by the marshal thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976).
98. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316
(1961).
99. See, e.g., International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp.,
351 F. Supp. 1153, 1204-05 (1972).
100. See Peacock, supra note 5, at 76; Private Divestiture-Revisited, supra
note 5, at 85; Comment, supra note 5, at 583; Private Divestiture, supra note 5,
at 277.
101. The only difference between the two sections is a service and summons
sentence at the end of section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976).
102. See KINTNER, supra note 14, at 7-11.
103. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. at 30, 78.
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tion 15 was drafted in the image of section 4 to extend the same
governmental powers to the Clayton Act.' Second, the language
of section 16 is not identical to the language of section 15. Where
section 16 provides private parties with "injunctive relief", the
Government, by section 15, is authorized to institute "proceed-
ings in equity" by which violations of the Act may be "enjoined
or otherwise prohibited." Recognizing that "proceedings in eq-
uity" is broader than "injunctive relief', one may wonder why, if
Congress intended that private remedies should be coextensive
with governmental remedies, the substantive language of section
4 was not employed in section 16 as it was in section 15. The
interpretation of section 16 by analogy to section 15 is.not as
helpful as some have suggested.' 5
The second point for discussion regarding the language of sec-
tion 16 involves the consummated conduct rationale used by
some courts to conclude that section 16 does not include the
remedy of divestiture. 0 This rationale holds that because section
16 is directed to "relief . . . against threatened loss or damage"
under the same conditions that a court of equity will grant
"relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or
damage"'07 and because a completed merger between two corpo-
rations constitutes consummated conduct rather than threatened
conduct, section 16 does not embody the remedy of divestiture.
Many writers have argued vehemently that a completed (illegal)
merger continues to threaten the plaintiff with loss or damage
and that, hence, the consummate conduct rationale does not war-
rant the interpretation of section 16 to exclusive divestiture.'0 s
The issue is one of semantics, and although the statute is amen-
able to the interpretation suggested by past commentators, the
intent of Congress to include divestiture as manifested by the
statute on its face is not obvious. In common usage, "threatened
loss or damage" and "threatened conduct that will cause loss or
104. Comment, supra note 5, at 583.
105. See supra note 100.
106. See, e.g., Westor Theatres v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 41 F. Supp. 757,
763 (D.N.J. 1941); Graves v. Cambria Steel Co., 298 F. 761, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1924);
Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 250 F. 292, 296 (D.N.J. 1918).
107. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) (emphasis added).
108. See Peacock, supra note 5, at 70-71; Private Divestiture-Revisited,
supra note 5, at 85; Comment, supra note 5. at 590; Private Divestiture, supra
note 5, at 279.
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damage,"'' 9 taken together, refers to impending loss at a point in
time prior to the onset of the loss.10 This language very plainly
suggests a preliminary, prohibitive type of injunctive relief. The
language of section 16 may well be interpreted to include divesti-
ture, but an ordinary interpretation of the statute as a whole
suggests otherwise. If section 16 cannot be said to be ambiguous
on its face, neither can it be characterized as clear.
B. The Legislative History
The legislative history of section 16 presents a curious di-
lemma in the interpretation of the statute."' The controversy
centers around the propriety of interpreting section 16 based on
indications of the understanding of House Judiciary Committee
members as found in hearing transcripts" 2 of that committee.
Committee reports accompanying the Clayton Act are devoid of
any mention of the availability of private divestiture. ' Independ-
ent investigations of the hearings record have led to the conclu-
sion that members of the House Judiciary Committee inter-
preted section 16 to exclude the remedy of divestiture."4 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in ITT,''
found this to be persuasive and conclusive evidence of congres-
sional intent and excluded divestiture from the reaches of sec-
tion 16.16 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit, in Brunswick,"' questioned the propriety of relying on the
hearings cited in ITT to determine important national policy.' 8
The apparent conclusive nature of the committee hearings is
109. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
110. See Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929) (Holmes, J.) ("there is no
canon [of statutory construction] against using common sense in construing laws
as saying what they obviously mean.").
111. The commentary set forth here was derived from an analysis of the
literature rather than an independent review of the legislative history.
112. Hearings on Trust Legislation Before the House Committee on the Ju-
diciary, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
113. Use of Divestiture, supra note 5, at 267 n.58; 89 HARV. L. REV. 1247,
1249.
114. See International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518
F.2d at 920-22; NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d at 278.
115. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
116. Id.




entitled to consideration and should not be cast aside as sug-
gested by the Brunswick court. '19 The problem arises in deter-
mining how much weight to accord that evidence. The absence of
discussion of the issue in the committee report accompanying the
bill"' diminishes the persuasiveness of the hearings record and
prevents the thoughts of the Judiciary Committee from being
conclusively inputed to Congress. While one may quibble over
the authority to be accorded a committee hearings record
vis-a-vis a committee report,' the legislative history of section
16, like the language of the statute," does not satisfactorily por-
tray the scope of the statute. The inquiry must continue.
V. SHOULD DIVESTITURE BE AVAILABLE TO PRIVATE PARTIES?
Because the statute and its legislative history fail to solve the
problem, the decision about whether divestiture should be
granted under section 16 must ultimately be based on other fac-
tors. Before deciding how a judge should rule on the issue, it is
instructive to reflect on the need for private divestiture within
the framework of the antitrust laws and the policy considera-
tions inherent in permitting private parties to seek divestiture.
A. The Need for Private Divestiture
According to the several legal commentators ' who have con-
sidered the question, the present system of antitrust laws has
certain inadequacies on which private divestiture will have a
favorable impact."4 These inadequacies may be distilled into four
considerations. First, several writers have urged that govern-
ment divestiture alone is inadequate to protect private parties
because of limited governmental resources'25 and because the
119. See Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra note 5, at 258.
120. H.R.REP No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
121. See International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518
F.2d at 921 (the district court and the court of appeals disagreed on the weight
to be accorded the committee hearings).
122. See supra text accompanying note 11.
123. See supra note 5.
124. Inadequacies are to be distinguished from disadvantages. Inadequacies,
as used herein, form the basis for a strong rationale for changing the status
quo, while disadvantages and advantages may be used for comparatively dis-
tinguishing between two or more choices.
125. See Use of Divestiture, supra note 5, at 263; Private Divestiture, supra
note 5, at 275.
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government may choose not to act, despite the illegality, for
reasons of its own."26 Although private parties may file a com-
plaint with the government, they have no inherent right to de-
mand government action.' Hence, the private remedy of divesti-
ture is deemed necessary to enable private parties to protect
themselves. The assertion that resource limitations hinder gov-
ernment enforcement has been disputed by former government
officials of the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Com-
mission.'28 Furthermore, the complexities and finality associated
with the remedy of divestiture may indicate that a government
decision to forego prosecution should not be overruled by a pri-
vate party having comparatively narrow interests. On the whole,
the adequacy of governmental enforcement seems ill-suited for
judicial evaluative procedures.
The second consideration suggested as an inadequacy in the
status quo is the ineffectiveness of repressive injunctions as a
substitute for divestiture. 29 One alternative to the use of divesti-
ture is to restrict the voting rights in the acquired stock. 3 ' It has
been suggested that while this limits the influence which an ac-
quiring corporation may exert on the acquired corporation, it
fails to diminish the desire to influence.'3 ' Moreover, the acquired
corporation's continued interest in the ultimate disposition of its
stock may be a source of leverage for the acquiring corporation
to achieve anti-competitive effects." 2 The cumbersome enforce-
ment procedure for injunctions has also been cited as an inade-
126. See Peacock, supra note 5, at 80-81; Use of Divestiture, supra note 5, at
263.
127. Private Divestiture, supra note 5, at 274.
128. See Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra note 5, at 241, 243 (statements
of Donald F. Turner, Former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Anti-
trust Division and James T. Halverson, Former Director, Bureau of Competi-
tion, Federal Trade Commission), But see Private Divestiture-Revisited,
supra note 5, at 91 (quoting statement of Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Former Chair-
man of the Federal Trade Commission that the government has insufficient
manpower "to deal with every competitive defect existing in every industry
throughout the economy").
129. See Peacock, supra note 5, at 82; Private Divestiture-Revisited,
supra note 5, at 96; Use of Divestiture, supra note 5, at 281.
130. It should be noted that voting restrictions are useful only in the case of
stock acquisitions, not asset acquisitions. See infra notes 146-50 and accompany-
ing text.




quacy of that remedy." The plaintiff must discover and prove
each individual violation before a contempt order may issue, nec-
essitating, in effect, a new trial for each alleged violation."3 The
shortcomings of injunctive relief other than divestiture approach
the level of a rationale for adopting divestiture, apart from con-
siderations of the effect of divestiture, only when the injunctive
relief fails to adequately curtail the illegal activity to which it
was directed. That injunctive relief may be more difficult to ad-
minister or less effective in general than divestiture is not
disputed. These problems do not, in themselves, however, war-
rant adoption of private divestiture, but instead should be bal-
anced against opposing considerations regarding divestiture.
A similar analysis applies to the third inadequacy cited in com-
mentary-the failure of treble-damage awards to provide private
parties with an adequate remedy. It has been suggested that
treble-damage awards are rarely obtained, due to the cost to the
plaintiff of conducting the litigation, the complexities of proving
violation of the antimerger laws, and reliance on prior govern-
ment successes. '35 In addition, the treble-damage action does not
terminate a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, requiring
additional litigation to fully compensate the aggrieved party. 3 '
To the extent that a treble-damage action does not provide an
adequate remedy, the arguments are well taken. Treble-damage
actions ordinarily are not appropriate in the case of unlawful
mergers, but their inadequacy is not a singular rationale for
change given the potential success of other remedies and pro-
cedures.
The final consideration regarding inadequacies in the present
system of enforcement is that divestiture may be the only appro-
priate remedy under the circumstances."3 This is perhaps the
most compelling argument for permitting private divestiture.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act is violated when the acquisition of
one corporation by another may substantially lessen competition.
133. See Use of Divestiture, supra note 5, at 281.
134. Id.
135. See Private Divestiture-Revisited, supra note 5, at 95; Private
Divestiture, supra note 5, at 273.
136. See Private Divestiture-Revisited, supra note 5, at 95.
137. See Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra note 5, at 254, 257; Comment,
supra note 5, at 598; Use of Divestiture, supra note 5, at 279-80.
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As Justice Brennan pointed out for the United States Supreme
Court in duPont,' it seems quite natural to respond to this il-
legal act by severing the acquisition. In the case of stock acquisi-
tions that are attacked with relative dispatch after the illegal
act, it is difficult to quarrel with this assessment. 9 Where the
acquisition involves comingled assets, or substantial delay by the
plaintiff, the equities may shift in favor of the defendant. Even
conceding that circumstances will arise where divestiture is the
sole effective remedy, private divestiture may still be unwar-
ranted. The country has amassed more than six decades under
the Clayton Act without a single divestiture at the instance of a
private party.
VI. FAVORABLE ASPECTS OF PRIVATE DIVESTITURE
Probably the most frequently cited benefit accorded private
divestiture is the premise that private litigants, by supplanting
government enforcement actions, may serve the public interest
as well as their own. 140 The history and significance of these pri-
vate attorneys general in the enforcement of the antitrust laws
is well documented.' Where the public interest is coextensive
with the private interest, the public is well served by the private
prosecutor whose divestiture action, although motivated by pecu-
niary gain, inures to the public good. Where there is not a one-
to-one correspondence between public and private interests, the
risk that the private prosecutor and likewise the court will over-
look aspects of the divestiture which are detrimental to the
public is increased." '
A second favorable aspect accruing from private divestiture
would be its deterrent effect on the consummation of mergers
which border on illegality.' This is deemed especially significant
138. See supra note 2.
139. See Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra note 5, at 255-56 (suggesting a
strict time limitation in terms of days for instituting a private divestiture ac-
tion).
140. See Private Divestiture-Revisited, supra note 5, at 91; Comment,
supra note 5, at 598; Use of Divestiture, supra note 5, at 263; Private
Divestiture, supra note 5, at 272.
141. See Private Divestiture, supra note 5, at 272 n.35.
142. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
143. See Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra note 5, at 243; Comment, supra
note 5, at 598.
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with regard to smaller, less extensive businesses which. might
otherwise escape notice by the government.' The presence of a
multitude of enforcers in every line of commerce in every section
of the country may well serve to curtail some illegal activity.'
A third point cited often in approval of private divestiture is
the relative ease with which the remedy may be applied in the
case of a takeover by stock acquisition.'" The ease of application
to stock acquisitions arises by contrast to the difficulties as-
sociated with divestiture of asset acquisitions. While both stock
and asset acquisitions are covered by section 7 of the Clayton
Act, asset divestitures are exceedingly difficult to implement.14 '
Illegally acquired assets may be difficult or impossible to dif-
ferentiate from assets not wrongfully acquired. Because a court
is powerless to affect the latter type of asset, divestiture of an
asset acquisition may not be feasible.'48 A stock acquisition, on
the other hand, when attacked within a reasonable period of time
after the takeover, seems particularly well-suited for private
divestiture.'49 Because the acquisition is recently consummated,
public and private interests are essentially coextensive. 1' With
potential harm to the public negated and a violation of the an-
titrust laws proven, there is no sound reason in these cir-
cumstances for denying to a private party the remedy of
divestiture.
Several favorable "side-effects" have occasionally been cited
with regard to private divestiture. For one, the remedy deprives
the defendant of the ill-gotten gains of its action.'5 ' For another,
divestiture, while never being a required remedy for any situa-
144. See Comment, supra note 5, at 598.
145. One might argue the enhanced significance of this factor given the indi-
cations by the Reagan Administration that enforcement of the antitrust laws is
not a high priority. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
146. See Peacock, supra note 5, at 79-80; Private Divestiture-Revisited,
supra note 5, at 98.
147. See Private Divestiture-Revisited, supra note 5, at 98.
148. Id.
149. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. at 328. See
supra note 3.
150. Peacock, supra note 5, at 81.
151. See Peacock, supra note 5, at 82; Private Divestiture-Revisited,
supra note 5, at 100. One might well query whether depriving the defendant of
its illegal gain is not penal in nature and thus an improper consideration in the
context of whether this civil remedy should be permitted.
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tion, provides the court with flexibility in working out decrees
aimed at restoring competition." 2 Finally, in the case of a viola-
tion of section 2 of the Sherman Act, divestiture breaks up the
defendant's monopoly power, restoring competition to the rele-
vant market."3
VII. PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATE DIVESTITURE
The policy considerations weighing against permitting private
parties to seek divestiture, at least those considerations having
the greatest merit, arise in one way or another from the absence
of government participation in the litigation. Foremost among
these is the potential conflict between private profit-seeking and
preservation of the public interest.' The antitrust laws are a
form of governmental regulation designed ideally to achieve and
to maintain competitive conditions in the regulated market. Only
incidentally do they recompense or reinstate an aggrieved com-
petitor. 5 The public's interest in a competitive market is not
necessarily well served by the decision of a business entity to
seek divestiture in an action against a competitor. While the
plaintiff in such a suit is necessarily a representative for all com-
petitive entities within the particular market as well as the cus-
tomers of that market,1" it is unlikely that the plaintiff will
represent before the court the point of view of all parties having
an interest in the result. The absence of the government may
well increase the volume of enforcement actions seeking divesti-
ture at the expense of public interest.
Just as private divestiture may conflict with the public in-
terest, so may it conflict with special interests of the govern-
ment as well. One commentator cites as an example the potential
conflict between government consent decrees and subsequent di-
152. See Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra note 5, at 243; Comment, supra
note 5, at 600.
153. See Private Divestiture-Revisited, supra note 5, at 100.
154. See Peacock, supra note 5, at 78; Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra
note 5, at 242-43; Comment, supra note 5, at 603; Use of Divestiture, supra note
5, at 283.
155. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488
(1977) ("The antitrust laws ... were enacted for 'the production of competition,
not competitors"') (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962)).
156. See Comment, supra note 5, at 603.
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vestiture actions by private parties."' Obvious disruptions in cur-
rent antitrust procedures and policies may result from indis-
criminate treatment of agreements between the government and
business." The potential frustration of a government policy to
maintain high concentration in a vital industry has also been
cited as a problem."9 Again, the nature of the antitrust laws as a
system of governmental regulation should prevent other private
interests.' This is not to say that the particular problems cited
above cannot be resolved in favor of permitting private divesti-
ture; the point is that the divergence of interests creates a po-
tential myriad of problems which may require greater attention
than is available in the judicial forum.
A third problem which arises from the absence of government
participation in the enforcement process is the loss of impartial-
ity and discretion offered by the government as a neutral en-
forcer.'' The antimerger law is a broad statement of policy
which the judiciary, through the guidance of the government,
has interpreted in a series of simple and yet arbitrary rules.'
The acceptability and success of these rules depends upon the
use of common sense in their enforcement. The government, by
exercising prosecutorial discretion, may opt not to attack a bor-
derline, but unlawful merger for reasons which it deems in the
public interest.'" In a private action a court would be forced to
rely on its own procedures to guarantee the impartiality lost
with the government. In an action seeking divestiture, often
characterized as a harsh and drastic remedy,'" the court may be
ill-equipped to guarantee the neutrality of an impartial prose-
cutor. In addition, the government has developed very careful
evaluative procedures involving legal and economic experts for
determining when to proceed against a merger. 1
157. See id. at 602.
158. See id.
159. See Use of Divestiture, supra note 5, at 283.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
161. See Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra note 5, at 241, 243; Comment,
supra note 5, at 601-02.
162. Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra note 5, at 241.
163. Id.
164. See Peacock, supra note 5, at 77-78.
165. Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra note 5, at 243.
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A final problem 16 regarding private divestiture is its potential
interference with the development of the antimerger law."7
Because private parties are uniformly interested in their own re-
covery, the arguments and policies which they urge on the
courts in favor of their cause may lack the consistency of the
government's approach in seeking to develop the law along cer-
tain lines. The government's approach is paramount inasmuch as
the antitrust laws are fundamentally regulatory of the economy."8
Furthermore, the absence of the government in a private divesti-
ture action may promotb judicial conservatism and thereby re-
sult in base case law. 69
VIII. CONCLUSION
Neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history
indicates conclusively whether divestiture is a remedy provided
to private parties by section 16 of the Clayton Act. Inadequacies
in the government's mechanism for enforcing section 16 have
been exposed by many writers and yet the lack of even a single
private divestiture to date speaks strongly against the asserted
needs. Powerful and complex issues of public policy, economics
and law provide strong arguments for those who favor the rem-
edy as well as those who oppose it.
Even recognizing the breadth of latitude traditionally given
courts in determining antitrust policy, 7' the dilemma of private
divestiture is not a matter for judicial interpretation; it is a mat-
ter of policy properly settled by the legislature. The legislature
must determine the adequacy of government enforcement techni-
166. Problems cited in the commentary but deemed to be of little or no con-
sequence include the harassment potential of a private divestiture action, see
Peacock, supra note 5, at 81; Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra note 5, at 243;
Private Divestiture-Revisited, supra note 5, at 93; Comment, supra note 5, at
602, the potential for a flood of litigation, see Private Divestiture-Revisited,
supra note 5, at 93; Comment, supra note 5, at 602; Private Divestiture, supra
note 5, at 281, and the inability of a court of equity to issue a mandatory injunc-
tion, see Peacock, supra note 5, at 72.
167. See Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra note 5, at 243.
168. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
169. Turner, Halverson & Berger, supra note 5, at 243.
170. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) ("In the anti-trust field the
courts have been accorded, by common consent, an authority they have in no
other branch of enacted law ... ").
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ques and the effectiveness of alternative remedies. Only the leg-
islature can properly balance the need for private attorneys
general having the power to seek divestiture against the problems
inherent in a divestiture action devoid of government support.
The legislature is the proper body to limit private divestiture to
the case of stock acquisitions, or to place a time limitation on the
initiation of such an action, or to require that private divestiture
actions be brought in the form of class actions. The issue of
private divestiture is a question of policy which falls outside the
province of the courts. Courts should decline to permit private
parties to seek divestiture and patiently await a legislative
response.
David S. Wise

